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Abstract 
In this paper the problematic nature of use and appropriation of the language used for one set of 
purposes by those who have other purposes in mind will be discussed. The popular notions of paradigm 
and entropy are explored as one discipline seeks to borrow words, terms, and signs from other 
(frequently more mature and concrete disciplines. At times the original intention is salvaged, but 
frequently other meaning is substituted—deliberately or not—in the process of appropriation. There are 
examples of a discipline adopting terms originating in another one, and the challenges that ensue. 
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1 Introduction 
Is language a tool? A more pertinent question for our purposes is: Is language merely a tool? If one 
answers in the affirmative, then it is possible to derive meaning explicitly and universally from a 
vocabulary that have specific semantic values. However, misunderstanding exists; for example, any 
vocabulary is likely to be polysemous. That is, a word or sign may have more than one distinct meaning 
(a “mole” may be a burrowing animal or an information gatherer in an organization). Because of this, 
there is reason to believe that language is something more than a tool, more than a device that can be 
employed for certain uses, and only those uses. That second viewpoint introduces cultural elements, 
including habits, beliefs, values, and background knowledge. It is extremely difficult for a limited 
conception of “information” to capture the variability that inheres in such complex human thought and 
action. As Daniel Everett (2012) suggests, “misunderstandings abound among people because their 
feelings and thought are so often inadequately communicated, even in principle, by the languages they 
speak” (p. 50). Information, it is recognized, is not limited to language, but language does have 
informative power that must for any examination of human meaning and communication to be 
undertaken. 
 
[N.B.: In addition to “word,” “term,” and “language” being spoken of here, there will be references to signs 
and sign systems. Semiotics applies here. Without adding a technical element here, signs are directly 
involved in making meaning by incorporating referents into the interpretive process. Of note here, the 
originating discipline (the field that coins a term) works from a set of existing and newly formed referents 
that can enable the interpretation of the sign within a context. Presented here are instances wherein 
referents are either partial or absent. Because of the absence, interpretation is made much more difficult. 
Space prevents more explication of semiotics here.] 
The literal operation of language provides a beginning for the phenomena that will be investigated in this 
presentation. In particular, the limitations and possibilities of translation will be offered as informative 
human action. Peter Fikins (2012), himself a translator of literature into English, says, “Whether we 
realize it or not, translation is the hidden lens through which almost all of human knowledge is processed” 
(p. B14). The translation of a work from, say, French into English can provide an obvious example of 
Fikins’ point. What will be explored here, though, is the appropriation of words and terms from one 
domain by another also carries semantic import. The appropriation can, sometimes, enhance 
understanding in the second domain, or it can lead to misunderstanding. One thing cannot be assumed—
the appropriation is by no means necessarily informative. Rather than giving shape to our understanding, 
the appropriation may misshape appropriation. 
2 Examples 
About five decades ago Thomas Kuhn (1962) suggested a model intended to describe the work actually 
undertaken by scientists. (N.B.: he did state that this model is not the same as describing the objectives 
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of science.) To emphasize one point, he introduced the word “paradigm;” unfortunately, as Masterman 
(1970) demonstrated, he included multiple usages of the word in the 1962 version of his book; in fact, she 
counted more than twenty definitions of the word and concluded that “paradigm had limited meaning 
within Kuhn’s own conceptual construct. Kuhn endeavored to clarify his intention in the 1970 edition of his 
book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions; the meaning was narrowed to (a) the constellation of beliefs 
held by scientists comprising a community, and (b) the problem-solving work emanating from that 
community. In his clarification Kuhn (1970) stated that aspiring scientists employ accepted paradigms as 
mechanisms according to which knowledge of “how the world behaves” can be attained (p. 170). The 
implication here is that there is a discernible “way” that the world behaves. A corollary that he introduced 
at the same time is that paradigms signal sets of beliefs scientists share and problems upon which 
scientists act. Kuhn’s conception of paradigm has been somewhat controversial, but, to a considerable 
extent, it has been adopted by disciplines outside the natural sciences. When his advice is heeded inside 
the social sciences the implication may be that a paradigm can lead the way to an understanding of the 
manner in which human action unfolds. As a side remark here it must be noted that the original edition of 
Structure was published as a volume in the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, established by 
members of the Vienna Circle. 
The appropriation of paradigm within the social sciences has a substantial tradition. Wray (2011) attempts 
to summarize Kuhn’s own development of the concept; he speaks unreservedly about “science,” implicitly 
including the social sciences under that umbrella. Wray refers to paradigm as a “concrete exemplar that 
functions as a guide to future research” (p. 394). First, that definition would omit revolutions, and second, 
it is an open question whether the social sciences can employ such a concrete exemplar (paradigm) at 
all. Ashcroft (2010) explicitly cites Kuhn in describing “discursive paradigms” that shape thought in social 
work practice. Moreover, she asserts that there are social determinants that define those discursive 
paradigms. An inferred result may be that there is a circular dynamic wherein what is said shapes what is, 
which then shapes what is said. Sayer (1992) presents what may be the most cogent evaluation of a 
relativist employment outside the sciences: 
 
Perhaps the most basic deficiency of [gestalt shifts and similar] views is the drastic 
underestimation of the number of schemata and concepts we use of the implication that they 
are all tightly welded together by relations of logical entailment into a monolithic block. It then 
appears that there can be no shades of meaning, only either total conformity (within 
paradigms) or total incompatibility (between paradigms) (p. 73). 
 
The appropriation of “paradigm” is not limited to the social sciences; humanities scholars have also 
incorporated it into their work. Vouyouca (2010) makes explicit use of the concepts of paradigm and 
incommensurability (another of Kuhn’s ideas) in an examination of Nikos Kazantzakis’s Odyssey. As it 
happens Vuoyouca concludes that Odysseus does not follow a model, or exemplary, path as a leader; 
then intentional employment of Kuhn’s concepts can be called into question here. 
 
At times there are stances that admit to paradigms, or a legitimacy to paradigmatic disciplinary work, but 
simultaneously assert that there is a decidedly preferred exemplar. Hendry (2010) maintains that a 
paradigm of narrativity can overcome (triumphantly) a potential incommensurability between quantitative 
and non-quantitative methods of inquiry. Hendry does not admit that Kuhn saw incommensurability as a 
natural stage of paradigm transform, so the disruptive adoption of Kuhn’s terminology can lead to 
confusion both of intention and of outcome in disciplinary work. At an extreme, Houser and Schrader 
(1978), in information science, equate paradigm with science and claim that information science cannot 
be a science if there is no paradigmatic structure in the discipline. They presume that Kuhn’s idea 
(actually, their interpretation of Kuhn’s idea) of the structure of science is universally agreed to and that it 
universally obtains. It may be safe to say that there is not a single constellation of beliefs or set of 
commonly accepted problems, but that would signal that information science does not typify Kuhnian 
normal science, as he defines the work of scientific fields. The solution, according to Houser and 
Schrader (1978) is that information science should become paradigmatic, even if that limits the 
possibilities for beliefs and problems. The appropriation of language in this instances leads to a singular 
definition of science and of what it means to be scientific. 
 
Another term in Kuhn’s text has also been appropriated, but less frequently, and with less problematic 
effect, than paradigm. The term is “incommensurability.” According to Kuhn, the adherents to a revolution 
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speak in a sign system that cannot readily be understood by the practitioners of normal science. The 
language of the revolutionary science is incommensurable to those scientists in the normal framework. 
Kuhn’s claim is controversial; it may be that practitioners of normal science comprehend the language of 
revolutions, but they may reject that language and what it stands for. This term is sometimes appropriated 
in information studies, as Garrett (2007) does: “Bibliographic records regularly combine two 
incommensurable types of description: one that captures the physical and textual facts of a works, the 
other that seeks to encompass succinctly the work’s intellectual content” (p. 69). Garrett’s claim could be 
disputed on at least a few grounds, not the least of which is that intellectual content is also factual. More 
importantly, one who consults a bibliographic record may well be able to understand the two elements (or 
intentions) of a record, without experiencing incommensurablilty at all. 
There are other examples of appropriation that are not presumed to be tropes, but appear to have literal 
intentional meaning. The literal elements create difficulties for meaning, and the difficulties arise first with 
those who employ the language. As James Carey says, “Our basic orientation to communication remains 
grounded, at the deepest roots of our thinking, in the idea of transmission: communication is a process 
whereby messages are transmitted and distributed in space for the control of distance and people” (p. 
15). Further, W. Barnett Pearce states, “If you were to ask the first ten people you meet on the street to 
define ‘communication,’ all ten would likely give you some version of what we call the transmission 
theory.” Pearce’s observation can actually by quite comforting. It confirms a persistent feeling: most 
people have a firm and quite unproblematic notion of communication. After all, it is obvious; 
communication is a process of transmission: “Communication is the exchange of ideas,” they say. “It’s the 
process by which a message is transmitted to another person. It’s about making oneself understood.” 
Some people throw in terms they have come across in communication classes, such as “sender,” 
“receiver,” “encode” and “decode.” But it all comes down to the same basic idea: communication is about 
a message moving from one place to another and, at this level, it all seems very straightforward. “I have 
an idea,” they elaborate, “and I transmit it to you, and you have the idea. If the resultant ideas are the 
same, we have communicated.” This appears to be the transmission view of communication in a nutshell. 
But why do we talk about communication this way, and where did this way of talking come from? Does 
this way of talking describe the “reality” that is communication? 
Also within the presentation, the profound impact of the mathematical theory of communication developed 
by Claude Shannon (1949) will be examined. “Profound” is used here, not necessarily because of the 
insights that Shannon offered in his theory, but in the manner in which Shannon’s theory legitimated a 
whole realm of discourse that became our common sense conception of communication. As Peters 
(1986) argues, “While communication was trying to carve out an institutional place for itself in universities 
during the 1950s and 1960s, something else was happening in intellectual life that served to elevate the 
fortunes of communication-information theory. The concept of “entropy” in information theory is 
sometimes appropriated by, for example, literary studies. The appropriation is most frequent in criticism 
that tends to be avowedly “postmodern.” Of course postmodern itself embodies polysemy; there are 
numerous definitions of the word across disciplines and within a discipline like literary studies. In semiotic 
terms, postmodern borders on being an empty signifier; in the absence of an explicit definition it may lack 
meaning (see Lyotard (1984), for instance). Buehrer’s examination of Gaddis’s novel, JR, employs an 
economic usage of postmodernism, but he extends the analysis to entropy: 
 
This engineering or mechanization of the human character looms as part of the entropic 
undercurrent of JR, and fragmentation—particularly of speech and the human body—serves 
as Gaddis’s principal fictional device for exposing this “man in the machine” theme, or man 
as a merely quantifiable function(ary) of a systemic or corporate entity (p. 368). 
 
Buehrer equates machinic with entropic in this investigation; the equation is not atypical in literary studies. 
The appropriation extends beyond the concept of entropy to the operations of machines no matter what 
their purposes or functions. 
3 Discussion 
 
Taken together, the above examples illustrate a potentially deleterious effect for the creation and 
transmission of meaning through the appropriation of language intended for specific purposes. 
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Phenomenology enters the picture here. If a speaker incorporates terminology that has been coined to 
refer to operations, processes, or phenomena that are particular to certain purposes, that person is likely 
to have an intentionality that accompanies the act of coining the terminology. One philosophical stance—
realism—that cannot be ignored is that articulated by John Searle (1998): “There is a real world that 
exists independently of us, independently of our experiences, our thoughts, our language” (p. 5). If that 
viewpoint obtains, then many usages of problematic signs (such as paradigm and entropy) are not 
warranted. If that premise is true, the author employing unwarranted language should take care to use 
signs that are more reflective of the actual state of the world. If the premise does not hold, the authors 
must take care to provide explicit operational definitions for the signs they use. If, for example, one does 
follow postmodernism, one is more likely to adopt a relativist stance regarding language. That stance is 
mistaken, however, at least insofar as meaning (semantics) is a necessary feature of language. In any 
event, the terminology, divorced from the intentionality, becomes a challenge for meaning and 
understanding; moreover, the problematic language can lead to challenges to understanding and, 
ultimately, to action. 
 
What is needed is the seeming paradox of objective language that can express subjective sensibility of 
the world as it is. Husserl (1970) articulates the aim: “True being is everywhere an ideal goal, a task of 
episteme, or ‘reason,’ as opposed to being which through doxa is merely thought to be, unquestioned and 
‘obvious’” (p. 13). Sokolowski (2000) also notes that the phenomenological project examines both 
presence and absence, so there is a dual perception at work that is not easily captured by wholly 
objective language. He remarks that, at times, we are presented with things that we know we cannot 
comprehend; the meaning of something (including the appropriations of another discipline’s signs) eludes 
us (p. 37). If, to refer to an example above, someone claims that information science is “pre-
paradigmatic,” a hearer may well know that something critical is being mentioned, but may not be able to 
translate it into terminology that makes sense outside Kuhn’s specific meaning. In part, what is missing is 
historical knowledge. Without a full understanding of the history from which Kuhn or Shannon operate, a 
hearer or reader is without a context within which to place the meaning of these signs. In short, what is 
lacking, in phenomenological terms, is full consciousness of the linguistic state of affairs someone intends 
to communicate. At another level, if the language (the set of signs) of one discipline is misappropriated by 
those in another discipline, then there may not be a possibility for consciousness of meaning. As Merleau-
Ponty (19862) explains, the experience of the one who apprehends/perceives what is appropriated from 
another discipline is a totality that does not include the original sign system of the creating discipline. 
 
The experience does not mean that the original expression or sign does not refer to the world as it may 
be perceived. “I” do not possess the historicity that is held in common by, for example, Shannon when he 
uses “entropy” to explain the mathematical theory of communication. If, say, a literary critic also does not 
have the historicity, but uses the sign “entropy” to attempt to explain a literary device, that critic is likewise 
going to misapprehend the sign. In other words, the language is mis-translated. We do not have a 
situation where the critic is saying something like, “chapeau means ‘hat’,” that critic may be intending 
something akin to, “’entropy’ is the equivalent of the dissolution of familial relations in the particular novel.” 
The critic’s experience may not allow for the technical/historical use of “entropy;” there may only be the 
misappropriation of the sign. Confusion may ensue. Sayer (1992) reminds us of a misconception we may 
have: 
 
The common tendency to think of knowledge as a product or a thing which exists outside of 
us, which we can “possess” and which is stored in finished form in our heads or in libraries. 
We tend not to think in terms of knowing, which is in the process of becoming, “in solution”, 
as consciousness, but as a thing already “precipitated” (p. 16). 
 
These ideas presented here do not negate objectivity, but they necessitate acceptance of subjectivity as 
well. The subjectivity includes historicity, which is necessary for comprehensible expression in most 
disciplines. 
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